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160 PEOPLE v. Cos·rA l40 C.2d 
!Crim. No. :1370. In Bank. ,Jan. 9, 1953.] 
THE PEOPI,E, 1\espomlcnt, v. NORMAN HOBER'l' COS'l'A, 
Appellant. 
[1] Negligence-Gross Negligence.-Gross nPgligence is want of 
slight diligence, an entire failure to exercise care, or the 
exercise of so slight a degree of care as to justify the belief 
that there was an indifference to the things and welfare of 
others and that want of eare which would raise a presumption 
of the conscious indifference to consequences. 
[2] Homicide-Evidence-State of Mind of Defendant.-In pros-
ecution of automobile driver for manslaughter, the fact that, 
less than one-half hour before the accident, an officer who 
stopped defendant called his attention to the conditions of his 
probationary operator's license and the dangers of high speed 
driving is relevant to the issue whether his act of driving at 
a high rate of speed after having consumed alcoholic beverages 
was mere inadvertence or disclosed a conscious indifference 
to consequences. 
[3] !d.-Evidence-Proof of Other Crimes.-In prosecution of 
automobile driver for manslaughter, even if evidence as to 
defendant's having been eautioned by an officer less than 
one-half hour before the accident as to the dangers of high 
speed driving tends to show a previous crime, such evidence 
would not be inadmissible for the purpose of showing whether 
his act of driving at a high rate of speed after having con-
sumed alcoholic beverages was mere inadvertence or disclosed 
a conscious indifference to eonsequences. 
[ 4] Criminal Law- Evidence- Other Crimes.--Except when it 
shows merely criminal disposition, evidence which tends 
logically and by reasonable inference to establish any faet 
material for the prosecution, or to overcome any material fact 
sought to be proved by the defense, is admissible although it 
may conneet the aeeused with an offense not included in the 
charge. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Negligence,§ 7; Am.Jur., Negligenee, §§ 4:3, 47. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law,~ 168 et Req.; Am.Jur., Evidenee, 
§ 310 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] N egligenee, § 7; [2] Homicide, §58; 
[3] Homicide, §102; [4] Criminal Law, §393(2); [5] Homieide, 
~ 262; [6] Homieide, ~ 247; [7, 9] Homieide, § 117; [8] Criminal 
Law, §510; flO] Criminal Law, §1382(12); [11] Homieide, 
~ 148(2). 
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(5] Homicide-Appeal~~Harmless Error-Admission of Evidence. 
~-o-ln prosecution of automobilP dri\·er for manslaughter, any 
PJTor in 11rlmission of testimony with regard to defendant's 
conditional opPrator's liePnsP, the conditions of which had 
expired prior to the date of the accident, was not prejudicial 
where there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt 
exclusive of the challenged testimony. ( Const., art. VI, § 4%.) 
16] Id.- Appeal- Objections- Evidence.-On appeal from an 
automobile driver's conviction of manslaughter, such driver 
may not successfully complain that officer's remark that, prior 
to stopping driver, he had stopped "another law violator," 
where no objection was made to such statement, nor did coun-
sel for driver move to strike it as unresponsive or a conclu-
sion of the witness, and where, in any event, it cannot be 
said that such comment in the common parlance of the police 
force was prejudicial. 
[7] Id.- Evidence- Res Gestae- Statements of Deceased.-In 
prosecution of automobile driver for manslaughter, statement 
by deceased after he regained consciousness was not inad-
missible because of the lapse of some five to ten minutes after 
the accident, where due to the fact that he was unconscious 
during this interval he could not have been planning his re-
marks or reconstructing the occurrence in his mind, and the 
situation of itself satisfied the requirements of the res gestae 
rule. 
f81 Criminal Law-Evidence-Res Gestae.--Declarations to be a 
part of the res gestae, are not required to be precisely con-
current in point of time with the principal fact; if they spring 
out of the principal transaction and tend to explain it, are 
voluntary and spontaneous, and are made at a time so near it 
as to preclude the idea of deliberate design, then they are re-
garded as contemporaneous and are admissible. 
[9] Homicide-Evidence-Res Gestae-Statements of Deceased.-
In prosecution of automobile driver for manslaughter, state-
ment by deceased which otherwise meets the tests of the res 
gestae rule is not inadmissible merely because it was made 
in response to the question "What happened?" where the offi-
cer asking the question did not engage in any extended inter-
rogation which may have led the deceased to deliberate in an 
effort to explain what happened or to defend his own actions. 
[10] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Admission of Evi-
dence.-In prosecution of automobile driver for manslaughter 
as result of accident involving another vehicle, any error in 
admitting deceased's statement in evidence was not prejudicial 
[R] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, ~ 190 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 662 et seq. 
40 C.2d--6 
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wlH•re defPmlant admitted tlJat he struck the other vehicle 
from tht> J"Pa1·, whinh was tlw ouly import of' tht> rPmnrk marlt> 
hy dt>ePa:-wd. 
[11] Homicide-Evidence-Manslaughter.--A conviction of auto-
mobile driver for manslaughter as result of accident involving 
another vehicle is sustained by evidence tending to prove that 
defendant, traveling at a speed approaching 90 miles per hour 
aft<~r having consumed several alcoholic drinks, pulled out 
into the passing lane directly behind the other vehicle which 
already was occupying that space and traveling at a legal rate 
of speed, and without noticeably reducing his spe~d rammed 
the other vehicle, such conduct demonstrating an entire failure 
to exercise care and a conscious indifference to consequences 
and therefore being sufficient to show that he was guilty of 
gross negligence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
,Joa<Juin County. 'fhomas B. Quinn, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for manslaughter. Judgment of conviction 
affirmed. 
Smith & Zeller and Charles A. Zeller for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Gail A. Strader, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Norman Robert Costa was convicted by 
the court, sitting without a jury, of manslaughter committed 
in the driving of an automobile. 
During early morning hours, Costa was driving a Cadillac 
automobile around the countryside with three other young 
men. All of them had been drinking and, at one time dur-
ing the morning, Costa stopped and purchased a half-case 
of beer. Earlier, he had consumed three or four whisky 
highballs. He and his passengers drank some of the beer 
while they drove, Costa having had two cans of it shortly be-
fore the accident. By stipulation of the parties, a chemist's 
report was admitted into evidence showing that, about two 
and one-half hours after the collision, Costa's blood had an 
alcoholic content of .12 per cent. 
Over objection, evidence was admitted that Costa's oper-
ator's license was conditional, although the conditions had 
expired prior to the date of the wreck. The conditions were 
that Costa should not "drive while drinking" and must 
not speed. 
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Approximately one-half hour before the collision occurred, 
Costa was stopped by Wen dell Nicol, a state highway patrol-
man. Objections to most of the officer's testimony were over-
ruled. He stated, ''I had just had another violator stopped 
when I first observed him (Costa)." At that time, he esti-
mated, Costa was driving '' [b] etween 50 and 60 miles an 
hour" along a two-lane side road which intersects the free-
way, a divided four-lane highway. The officer pursued Costa 
for approximately 4 miles before catching up with him, 
during a portion of which distance Costa drove on the free-
way at a speed of about 70 miles per hour. ·when Nicol 
finally was able to come close enough to clock the speed of 
Costa's automobile it was again on a side road and had 
~-;lowed to 55 miles per hour. 
Costa gave Nicol no explanation for his speed. He "just 
Htated that he realized he was wrong and that he shou]dn 't 
have been doing that." The officer noticed that Costa's 
driver's license "was a probationary license and I didn't 
want to prosecute the man unfairly by issuing him a cita-
tion without being definite as to his speed so I reprimanded 
him for driving like that and warned him that he had a 
probationary license and that if he got a citation or was 
in violation of the law that he would lose his license and 
he assured me that he would drive more carefully in the 
future, and I released him on that basis." The odor of 
Costa's breath indicated that Costa had been drinking, hut 
''not enough . . . to cause him to be examined.'' 
Another witness who had been driving along the freeway 
on the morning of the accident testified, over objection, that 
about six or seven minutes before the collision he observed 
the Costa automobile traveling at approximately 85 to 90 
miles per hour. Shortly thereafter, Costa passed a state 
highway patrol car parked, with its motor running, about 
100 to 150 feet off tbe opposite side of the freeway. The 
two offieers in the patrol car estimated the speed of the Costa 
automobile to he iu "exeess of 80" miles per hour, "between 
Pighty and eighty-five." They immediately started in pur-
suit, driving across the freeway and turning left to follow 
Costa.. In chasing him for approximately 2 miles, the police 
ear reached a top speed of about 92 miles per hour. No 
signal vvas given Costa to stop. 
Earl Sk(~d, the driver of the police ear, testified at tbe pre-
liminary examination, the transcript of which was admitted 
into evidence by stipulation. He said that the Costa auto. 
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mobile passed other vehicles to the left in the ''passing lane'' 
and then returned each time to the right lane. He kept 
watching the "large taillights of the Cadillac'' for a mile 
or one and one-half miles, meanwhile following in the pass-
ing lane. 
When the police car had reached a point approximately 
one-quarter of a mile behind the Cadillac, he could see "head-
lights other than the Cadillac up in the near vicinity of the 
Cadillac; suddenly, he saw a set of taillights divert sharply 
to the left ... off the roadway at a very abrupt manner; 
there was a cloud of dust and for a second our vision was 
obscured from the dust, a tree in the road.'' He stated: ''I 
did not see the lights that abruptly turned off prior to the 
accident; there was another car to the right of the Cadillac.'' 
The other automobile was traveling in the right-hand lane, 
but its lights were not the ones which he saw veer off the 
highway. He explained that he was concentrating on his 
driving and his attention was focused on the Cadillac. He 
saw only two cars, he said, and "didn't know there was any 
Jeep there.'' 
When he reached the scene of the accident, Officer Sked 
brought the police car to a stop behind the Cadillac. The 
automobile which had been traveling in the right-hand lane 
pulled off on the shoulder of the highway and stopped tem-
porarily. However, according to Officer Sked, "due to the 
excitement of the moment they got away before we could 
contact them." He asked Costa for his driver's license and 
Costa handed it to him ''stating that it was a conditional 
license." Officer Skeel stated: "I looked the car over and 
I noticed some canned beer in the back and I asked him 
about that and he says yes that he had had a couple of 
drinks and he guessed that he was driving a little bit too 
fast.'' 
I,ee Marshall, a state highway patrolman riding with Officer 
Skeel, testified: "I could see a triangle of three lights, three 
taillights .... There was a taillight in the right hand lane, 
one in the center lane and the Cadillac in behind.'' This 
was about 10 or 15 seconds before the crash and the Cadillac 
was traveling in the right-hand Jane. Then the Cadillac, ac-
cording to Officer Marshall, "moved over" and "blotted out 
the taillights" of the v<~hirlr in thr left lane and "all at once 
a set of taillights went off in a sharp curve.'' He said that 
the jeep was in the left-hand lane and the Cadillac turned 
into the left-hand lane and ran into the jeep and knocking 
,Tan. 1953] PEOPLE v. CosTA 
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him off the road.'' Aer~ording to l1im, only two or three 
sreondR elapsed between the time the f;osta ear turned into 
tlle left lane and the collision. 
After the accident, the jeep lay, on its left side, off the 
highway in the dividing strip. The four occupants were 
unconscious and tangled in the wreckage. George D. Marino, 
who, it is stipulated, died as a result of the accident, was 
lying along the left side of the jeep. Between five and ten 
minutes later, Officer Marshall talked to him. Over objec-
tion, Officer Marshall was permitted to testify as to this 
conversation. Marino said he had been driving the jeep. 
In response to the question, "What happened 1" Marino 
said, "The man hit us in the rear." 
None of the occupants of the jeep testified at Costa's trial. 
One of the passengers in Costa's automobile was asleep when 
the accident occurred and had no knowledge of how it hap-
pened. A second was not called. The testimony of the third 
passenger, a member of the armed forces, was given by depo-
sition. 
This witness said that he was sitting on the right-hand 
side of the back seat. According to him, the Cadillac speed-
ometer registered 90 miles per hour shortly before the 
crash. He first saw the jeep about 40 yards ahead of 
them when the Cadillac was in the left lane beside an-
other automobile to its right. He did not see the jeep 
swerve into the left lane, it was there when he first noticed 
it. He saw ''the whole back part of the Jeep'' from the 
spare tire up. Realizing that there would be a crash, he 
called to his friend in the front seat to duck and threw him-
self to the floor in the back. He did not see the collision. 
Costa, testifying on his own behalf, said that he was driv-
ing about 70 or 75 miles per hour immediately prior to the 
accident. He stated that he pulled over to the left lane to 
pass a slower moving vehicle ahead of him in the right lane. 
Before so doing, he saw no other vehicle ahead in the left 
lane. He glanced to the left and right to be certain that he 
was clear at an intersection and then momentarily looked 
to the right to see if he had clearance around the automobile 
he was passing. According to Costa, ".As I was passing 
it, ... I looked up and I saw the vehicle I hit." It was 
entirely within the left lane, about 60 feet in front of his 
automobile, and "was on an angle." He said: "It was 
directly in front of me but to me it was at an angle and 
my left front hit the left rear corner of it." He tried to 
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apply his brakes before the eollision, but things happened 
RO rapidly that he did not nc·all whether be was snncessful 
in so doing. 
In support of his appeal from the judgment of conviction, 
Costa contends that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error in the admission of evidence concerning the warning 
given him for speeding earlier in the morning, the condi-
tional license which he held, and the statement by Marino 
after he regained consciousness. He also claims that the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment. The attor-
ney general disputes each of these contentions. 
The statute under which Costa was convicted provides: 
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, 
without malice .... 3. In the driving of a vehicle-(a) In 
the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony 
with gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act 
which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with 
gross negligence." (Pen. Code, § 192.3[a].) [1] "Gross 
negligence has been repeatedly defined in the California cases 
as 'the want of slight diligence,' 'an entire failure to exer-
cise care, or the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to 
justify the belief that there was an indifference to the things 
and welfare of others,' and 'that want of care which would 
raise a presumption of the conscious indifference to conse-
quences.' " (Cooper v. Kellogg, 2 Cal.2d 504, 510-511 [ 42 
P.2d 59] ; Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal.2d 116, 123 [208 P.2d 367] ; 
Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal.2d 226, 232-233 [70 P.2d 183, 112 
A.L.R. 407] ; Kastel v. Stieber, 215 Cal. 37, 46-47 [8 P.2d 
474] ; Krause v. Rarity, 210 Cal. 644, 654-655 [293 P. 62, 
77 A.L.R. 1327] .) 
[2] An important question in the prosecution, therefore, 
was what Costa's actions, as related to the surrounding cir-
cumstances, disclosed concerning his state of mind. Was 
his act of driving at a high rate of speed after having con-
sumed alcoholic beverages mere inadvertence, or did it dis-
elose a conscious indifference to consequences? The fact that, 
less than one-half hour before the accident, an officer who 
stopped him called his attention to the conditions of his op-
erator's license and the dangers of high speed driving was 
relevant to this issue. 
[3] Costa concedes that the evidence did not disclose a 
"previous violation of law." Therefore, there is little merit 
to his argument that it ''must necessarily have had an in-
flammatory effect upon the mind of the Court." However, 
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even if it tended to show a previous crime, it would not have 
been inadmissible for the purposes for which it was intro-
duced. [4] "It is settled in this state that except when it 
t>hows merely criminal disposition, evidence which tends logi-
cally and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material 
for the prosecution, or to overcome any material fact sought 
to be proved by the defense, is admissible although it may 
connect the accused with an offense not included in the 
eharge." (People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504, 509 [218 P.2d 
981]; People v. Dabb, 32 Cal.2d 491, 499-500 [197 P.2d 1]; 
People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 314-315 [169 P.2d 924].) 
According to Costa, ''The prosecution offered and there 
was received in evidence, over the appropriate objection of 
the defendant, extensive testimony with regard to a condi-
tional license, the conditions of which had expired prior to 
the date of the accident in question.'' He points to his own 
testimony upon cross-examination as having been erroneously 
admitted over objection. .Although thorough, it hardly war-
rants the use of the adjective "extensive." He admitted, 
without objection, that his license was conditional. Objec-
tion was made, and overruled, to only two questions. The 
reply to the first established that his conditional license had 
not been replaced by an unrestricted license at the time of 
the accident. 'l'he second question dealt with the conditions 
of his license. 
[5] If it be assumed that the admission of this evidence 
was erroneous, it was not prejudicial. .A careful examination 
of the entire record in accordance with article VI, section 
41;2 of the Constitution, diseloses overwhelming evidence of 
Costa's guilt exclusive of all the challenged testimony. Under 
the circumstances, it cannot be said that the admission of 
evidence concerning his conditional license resulted in a mis-
carriage of justice which would justify a reversal of the 
judgment. (Const., art. VI, § 4¥2; cf. People v. Dabb, supra, 
p. 501.) 
[6] It is argued that "the volunteer remark of the officer 
[Nicol), that prior to stopping Costa he had stopped 'an-
other law violator' " was inadmissible. No objection was 
made to the officer's statement and counsel for Costa did 
not move to strike it as unresponsive or a conclusion of 
the witness. In any event, it cannot be said that this com-
ment in the common parlance of the police force was in 
any sense prejudicial. 
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[7] Costa contends that the statement by Marino after he 
regained consciousness was inadmissible because the lapse of 
some five to ten minutes removed it from the operation of 
the res gestae rule. However, during this interval Marino 
was unconscious and could not have been planning his re-
marks or reconstructing the occurrence in his mind. The sit-
uation of itself satisfied the requirements of the res gestae 
rule. [8] ''Declarations to be a part of the res gestae, are 
not required to be precisely concurrent in point of time with 
the principal fact, if they spring out of the principal trans-
action, if they tend to explain it, are voluntary and spon-
taneous, and are made at a time so near it as to preclude 
the idea of deliberate design, then they are to be regarded 
as contemporaneous, and are admissible." (People v. Ver-
non, 35 Cal. 49, 51 [95 Am.Dec. 49]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1850; 
Lane v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 26 Cal.2d 575, 581-584 
[160 P.2d 21] ; Showalter v. Western Pac. R. R. Co., 16 Cal. 
2d 460, 465-470 [106 P.2d 895].) 
[9] Upon oral argument, Costa raised, for the first time, 
the contention that Marino's statement was not spontaneous 
because it was made in response to a question by Officer Mar-
shall. This argument has no merit. The officer did not en-
gage in any extended interrogation of Marino which might 
have led the latter to deliberate in an effort to explain what 
happened or to defend his own actions. He simply made the 
inquiry which anyone arriving upon the scene might have 
asked the injured man, ''What happened~'' The response 
was voluntary and spontaneous and the circumstances pre-
cluded the idea of deliberation. 
In Showalter v. Western Pac. R. R. Co., supra, the state-
ment held to be admissible was made in response to the 
question, ''How in the world did it happen, Joe~'' The reply 
to a question as to ''where the other car came from'' was 
}JC]d to be admissible as a part of the res gestae in Lane v. 
Pacific Greyhound Lines, supra. It would be unreasonable 
to prohibit evidence concerning spontaneous declarations in 
every case where they are prompted by a simple inquiry as 
to what oeeurred. 'l'he natural reaction of anyone arriving 
at the pla<~e where a11 a<,cideut haR occurred is to make suel1 
inquiry. 'I'he rnle for which Costa eontends would, in effect, 
bar resort to the res gestae doetrine in virtually every case 
of accidental injury. If the statement otherwise meets the 
tests of the res gestae rule, it should not be held inadmissible 
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simply hP<·am;r; it was promptPil by the question of another 
rerson. 
[10] If it be assumed that the trial court, in its discre-
tion, should not have admitted Marino's statement in evi-
dence, the error was not prejudicial. Costa admits that he 
struck the jeep from the rear, which is the only import 
of the remark made by Marino. It does not tend in any 
manner to refute Costa's argument that he hit the left rear 
~~orner of the jeep, rather than striking it squarely. Marino 
did not say what portion of the rear of the jeep was hit. 
[11] Costa's final contention that the evidence is insuf-
ficient to support the judgment cannot be sustained. The 
evidence is conflicting, but is amply sufficient to have con-
vinced the trial court that Costa was guilty of gross negli-
gence. It tends to prove that Costa, traveling at a speed 
approaching 90 miles per hour after having consumed several 
alcoholic drinks, pulled out into the passing lane directly 
behind the jeep which already was occupying that space 
and traveling at a legal rate of speed. Without noticeably 
reducing his speed, he rammed the smaller vehicle. Such 
conduct demonstrates an entire failure to exercise care and 
a conscious indifference to consequences. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Uibson, C .• T., Shenk, .T., 'l'raynor, .J., and Spence, .T., con-
curred. 
Schauer, .J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance and 
agree generally with the reasoning upon which it is based. 
I do not, however, agree with that portion of the majority 
opinion which holds that evidence of other crimes than that 
with which the defendant is charged may be admitted even 
though such evidence may tend to connect the defendant with 
the crime charged. No such evidence was offered in this case 
and therefore the discussion on this subject is dictum. My 
position with respect to the admission of evidence of other 
crimes than that with which a defendant is charged is set 
forth in my dissents in the following cases: People v. Peete, 
28 Cal.2d 306 [169 P.2d 924) and People v. Westek, 31 Cal. 
2d 469 [190 P.2d 9]. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
fi, 1953. 
